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)

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff sued Defendant to foreclose on a second
mortgage on property which was in the possession of DefendantAppellant JoAnn (Bass) Bartell pursuant to a Decree of Divorce,
and in which she had an ownership interest.
The lower court entered a Judgment, Decree of
Foreclosure and Order of Sale.

After the property was sold,

Defendant-Appellant made a motion for an order requiring
Plaintiff-Respondent to pay her the amount of her homestead
exemption, which motion was denied.
The Appellant sought to have the Order and Judgment
entered by the lower court denying her motion for payment of her
homestead exemption amount reversed, and to have the case
remanded with instructions for the lower court to enter an Order
and Judgment requiring Plaintiff-Respondent to pay DefendantAppellant the amount of her homestead exemption and to determine

the amount of interest, costs and reasonable attorneys1 fees to
be awarded to Appellant for her having to pursue this matter in
the lower court and on appeal to enforce her homestead rights.
On June 2, 1988, the Supreme Court issued its decision
denying Defendant-Appellant's appeal.
Defendant-Appellant, JoAnn Bass Bartell, petitions the
Court to grant a rehearing in the above-entitled case, pursuant
to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.

Counsel for

Petitioner certifies that this petition is presented in good
faith and not for delay.

ARGUMENT
Petitioner asserts the following point of law in
support hereof:
UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL HOMESTEAD, THERE EXISTS
NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ENFORCEMENT OF A NON-VENDOR
MORTGAGE AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF A MECHANIC'S LIEN,
WHICH ACTIONS MUST BE GIVEN CONSISTENT TREATMENT, AND
NEITHER OF WHICH IS ENFORCEABLE AGAINST THE HOMESTEAD
A.

Utah Constitutional and Early Legislative History
Regarding the Homestead Exemption Gave Equal
Treatment to Foreclosures of Mechanic' s Liens and
Mortgages
In discussing the Varian-Richard1s proposal which

eventually was adopted as the Constitutional provision, the
Framers never discussed the enforcement of mechanicsf liens or
the enforcement of mortgages against the homestead.
Prior to and during the Constitutional Convention, the
laws of Utah allowed both mechanicsf liens and mortgages to be
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foreclosed upon a homestead.
(1888).

Compiled Laws of Utah, 3429(11)

As the Court has noted on page 6 of its decision, Mr.

Varian stated at the convention that the then existing state
exemption statue of 1888 was presumed to be a good law, although
it was not subjected to any analysis.
The first legislature to meet after the Constitution
was adopted maintained the same exemption language regarding the
enforcement of mechanics' liens and mortgages against the
homestead.

See Laws of the State of Utah, Ch. LXXI, § 1 (1896).
On pages 6-7, the Court interprets the existence of the

1888 and 1896 statutes to imply that the Framers and the early
Utah legislators did not intend the "sale on execution" language
of the Constitutional homestead to apply to mortgage
foreclosures.

However, since mechanics' liens were also exempt

under these laws, it also follows, using the Court's logic, that
the Framers did not intend mechanic's lien foreclosures to be
"sales on execution."
B.

Volker (I) and Evans v. Jensen Decisions, taken
together, hold that non-vendor's liens and
mechanics' liens are "sales on execution" under
the Constitutional Homestead
This implication regarding non-vendor mortgages

and mechanics' liens not being "sales on execution" was given
short shrift by the Court in Volker-Scowcroft Lumber Co. v.
Vance, 32 Utah 74, 88 P.896 (1907) (hereinafter cited as "Volker
(I)"), appeal after retrial, 36 Utah 348, 103 P.970 (1909), which
held that a mechanic's lien foreclosure was a "sale on execution"
and was not enforceable against the homestead.

This decision, which was rendered only a few years
after the Constitutional Convention, was the first to really
consider the parameters of the homestead section.
In unsupported dicta, the Volker (I) Court stated that
the Constitution places no inhibition on the voluntary alienation
of a homestead.

Id at 83.

However, the voluntary alienation

issue was not presented, argued or briefed.

The Volker (I) Court

made a strained distinction between a mechanic!s lien
foreclosure, which they described as being "involuntary," and a
mortgage foreclosure, which was denominated as "voluntary." Id.
The Utah Constitutional homestead law, however, makes no such
differentiation between "voluntary" and "involuntary" sales.

It

merely protects against "sales on execution" no matter how they
arise.

The Volker (I) Court did not cite or consider the 1867

California Supreme Court decision in Peterson v. Hornblower,
discussed infra.
In other words, this strained distinction rewrites the
Constitutional homestead to be exempt form "forced sale,"
although the Constitutional Convention rejected numerous
proposals that contained the "forced sale" language in favor of
using the "sale by execution" language.

Indeed, the Court1s

decision would make Utah's homestead provision just like the
homestead provisions of many of the other states (which only
provide protection from "forced sale").
However, it is clear that the Utah Constitutional
homestead provision is unique and unlike the provisions in other

states.

See Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 7-11.

The

Court in Utah Builder's Supply Company v. Gardiner (Rehearing),
86 Utah 257, 259, 44 P.2d 789 (1934), stated that:
The Constitution and statutes of some of the other
states are radically different from our own, and, . . .
there is of necessity a different construction.
This Court should not rewrite the Constitution by adding the word
"forced" where it does not exist and was not intended to apply.
The logic the Volker (I) Court presented to support its
case for excluding mechanics' liens from the homestead is equally
applicable to non-vendor mortgages.

They noted first that if the

legislature was permitted to subject the homestead to a
mechanic's lien, but could not do so "if the debt arose in some
other way, is making a distinction not made by the Constitution."
Id. at 84. The same logic applies for mortgages.

Second, they

examined constitutions of other states and found that most of
them specifically provided for the homestead to be subject to
mechanics' liens, but Utah's did not.

Id.

The same can be said

with regard to mortgages in those other states.

Finally, they

reviewed the proceedings of the Utah Constitutional Convention,
and found that every proposal to allow mechanic's liens to attach
to homesteads was rejected.

Id.

The same argument applies to

mortgages but to an even greater degree, as even more Constitutional proposals were offered and rejected in this regard.
After the above review, the Court stated:
[I]t is obvious that the constitutional provision
exempts a homestead from execution sale without
restriction, limitation, or exception of any kind."
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Id, (Emphasis added,)
The next time the Court was faced with interpreting the
"sale on execution" limitation was in Evans v. Jensen, 51 Utah 1,
168 P. 762 (1917), another mechanic's lien foreclosure case.

The

Evans Court broke ranks with the unsupported dicta in Volker (I)
which had tried to distinguish between mortgage and mechanic's
lien foreclosures as it related to the homestead exemption:
[T]he person who performs the labor or furnishes the
materials, upon compliance with the statute, is just as
entitled to a specific lien against the property as
though he had obtained a mortgage,
e

e

•

The [mechanic's lien] statute entered into the
contract, and was just as much a part of it as though
it had been expressly set forth.
Id. at 9-10.
When one enters into a contract which results in a
mechanic's lien foreclosure, that act of contracting is just as
"voluntary" as the giving of a mortgage, and then defaulting
under it.

Therefore, non-vendor mortgages and mechanic's liens

are both "voluntary" encumbrances.
By applying the reasoning of Volker (I) to non-vendor
mortgages, such mortgage foreclosures are "sales on execution"
under the constitutional homestead, just like mechanic's lien
foreclosures.

This approach allows us to interpret the

Constitutional homestead by giving it a rational and obvious
construction based on its clear language, without rewriting it.

- 6 -

C.

Even before the Utah Constitutional Convention was
held, the California Supreme Court had held that
mortgage and mechanic's liens foreclosures were
not "forced sales," but were "sales on
execution."

In Peterson v. Hornblower, 33 Cal. 266 (1867),
decided many years before the Constitutional Convention of Utah,
the California Supreme Court considered a mortgage foreclosure
under their "forced sale" Constitutional homestead law.

It

placed its emphasis on the word "forced," and stated that:
"[A] 'forced sale' is not synonymous with a 'sale on
execution. ... The latter may be and often is
voluntary in every respect. ... Its guality, as being
voluntary or forced, depends not upon the mode of its
execution, but upon the presence or absence of the
consent of the owner.
It makes no difference in respect to its being forced
or voluntary, whether [the owner] consents directly to
the sale or does the same indirectly by consenting to
or doing those acts or things that necessarily or
usually eventuate in a sale. A foreclosure sale,
whether under the power of sale contained in the
mortgage or in pursuance of a decree, is not a forced
sale within the meaning of the [California]
Constitution.
That is, neither the foreclosure of a mortgage (direct consent),
nor the foreclosure of a mechanic's lien (indirect consent), are
"forced sales."

According to the California Court, they are both

"sales on execution."
The strained distinction the Volker (I) Court made
between mortgage foreclosures and mechanic's lien foreclosures
(voluntary versus involuntary) was not a well-accepted position
in the law at the time Volker (I) was decided.

Thus, the Framers

at the Utah Convention should have known that mechanics' liens
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and mortgage foreclosure sales were not "forced sales," but were
"sales on execution."
In placing the "sale on execution" language in the Utah
Constitutional homestead section, the men of the Convention had
the means to know (by reviewing the Peterson decision) that such
language would provide protection also against "voluntary"
encumbrances (mortgages and mechanics' liens).
D.

Both mortgage foreclosures and mechanic's lien
foreclosures are "sales on execution" under Utah
statutes and cases.
1.

Mortgages

The chapter of the Utah Code entitled "Mortgage
Foreclosure" states, in relevant part:
Judgment shall be given . . . and the sale of mortgaged
property, to satisfy said amount . . . and directing
the sheriff to proceed and sell the same according to
the provisions of law relating to sales on execution,
and a special execution or order of sale shall be
issued for that purpose.
Utah Code Annotated § 78-37-1.

(Emphasis added.)

By the

foregoing reference to "the provisions of law relating to sales
on execution," the subject section incorporates the provisions
concerning general execution sales under Rule 69 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
With respect to its reference to a "special execution,"
the guestion arises as to whether a "special execution" is an
"execution sale" or a "judicial sale."
a sale
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The general rule is that

made under a statutory fspecial execution1 . . .
partakes of the nature of a judicial sale if the
statute requires that the sale be reported to and
confirmed by the court, and makes the sale binding and
complete only when it is confirmed, since the act of
confirmation is a judicial act, otherwise, it is a
'sale on execution.1"
47 Am.Jur.2d, Judicial Sales § 3; see also, 30 Am.Jur.2d,
Executions § 304.
In Utah, once a decree of foreclosure and order of sale
are entered on a mortgage, the trial court has finished its
duties, and neither reviews nor confirms the foreclosure sale.
First National Bank of Salt Lake City v. Haymond, 89 Utah 151, 57
P.2d 1401 (1936).

Even the entering of the deficiency judgment

is performed by the Court Clerk.

Utah Code Annotated § 78-37-2.

In discussing mortgage foreclosure sales, the Supreme Court has
consistently referred to them as "sales on execution," and not as
judicial sales.

See, e.g., Reader v. District Court, 98 Utah 1,

94 P.2d 858 (1939); Local Realty v. Lindquist, 96 Utah 297, 85
P.2d 770 (1938); First National Bank, supra.
A further question arises concerning the nature of an
"order of sale", like the one utilized by the Plaintiff in the
case sub judice,

under the mortgage foreclosure provisions.

In

Utah Builders Supply v. Gardiner, 86 Utah 250, 39 P.2d 327
(1934), rehearing denied, 86 Utah 257, 42 P.2d 989, (1934), the
Court specifically held that an "order of sale" (used in Utah in
foreclosing both mortgages and mechanic's liens) is a "sale on
execution" unenforceable within the meaning of the Constitutional
homestead law, in reliance on Volker (I) and on Payson Exchange
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Sav. Bank v, Tietjen, 63 Utah 321, 225 P.2d 598 (1924). 86 Utah
at 253-259.
Because both "special executions" and "orders of sale"
fall within the ambit of "sales on executions" in this state,
non-vendor mortgages which utilize such procedure during
foreclosure may not be enforced against the homestead.

2.

Mechanics' Liens

When mechanics1 liens are foreclosed, the law
states that:
The court shall cause the property to be sold in
satisfaction of the liens and costs as in the case of
foreclosure of mortgage, subject to the same right of
redemption.
Utah Code Annotated § 38-1-15.

(Emphasis added.)

Exactly the same sale procedure is followed as in the
case of mortgages (i.e., according to the "law relating to sales
on execution," and through special executions or orders of sale).
Thus, the mechanic's lien foreclosure procedure is also a "sale
on execution" under the Constitution, from which the homestead is
protected.
The Court's decision on page 10 engages in some
historical analysis as it relates to mortgage foreclosures, and
suggests that such foreclosures are "judicial sales" and not
"execution sales," because they are quasi in rem proceedings.
However, mechanic's lien foreclosures are also quasi in rem
proceedings, and must be foreclosed using the same kinds of

proceedings used for a mortgage.

If the Court's analysis is

accepted, then both mortgage and mechanic's lien foreclosures
would be deemed "judicial sales."

As such, they would both

necessarily receive the same treatment under the homestead law.
On page 13 of its decision, the Court states that in
interpreting statutes, one must look to the plain language of the
statute and only if that language is ambiguous may such language
be ignored.

The Utah mortgage statute, which is incorporated

into the mechanic's lien statute, clearly states that the
"sheriff shall . . . sell the same according to the provisions of
law relating to sales on execution."
37-1 (1987) (emphasis added).

Utah Code Annotated § 78-

It is difficult to understand how

the legislature could have been any clearer.

Mortgage

foreclosures -- and, thus, mechanic's lien foreclosures -- are
undeniably "sales on execution" under this mortgage section.
In Local Realty v. Lindquist, supra, the Supreme Court
determined that the "sale on execution" language in the mortgage
statute did not define any rights as between the mortgagee and
the mortgagor, but merely indicated the procedure to be utilized
in selling the property.

The case was not decided in relation to

the homestead provision.
To determine if a particular case involves a "sale on
execution," the only method that can be used is to look at the
procedure that is followed during the foreclosure phase.

The

Lindquist Court said that the "sale on execution" language is
procedural, so this language identifies the procedure used in
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mortgage foreclosures, which procedure is according to the law
for "sales on execution."

Further, the Lindquist Court on pages

772 and 773 refers to the mortgage foreclosure in two different
passages.

One describes it as being a "sale on execution" and

the other describes it as "an execution sale."

E.

Conclusion

Foreclosures of non-vendor mortgages and mechanics'
liens must be treated the same way under the Utah constitutional
homestead law, because both types of foreclosures are "sales on
execution."

By the express language of the Constitutional

homestead, the homestead is exempt from "sales on execution."
Because this pending decision and the Volker (I) decision treat
these two types of sales on execution differently, this
constitutional disparity should be corrected by the Court on
rehearing and reconsidering this Appeal.
DATED this 16th day of June, 1988.
Respectfully^submitted,

/

J£^i-~Frankl~in Farf
Michael F. Jones

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
JoAnn Bass Bartell
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
P.I.E. Employees Federal Credit
Union,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

No. 19766
F I L E D
June 2, 1988

v.
JoAnn Bass, an individual,
Rex Paul Bass, an individual,
Defendants and Appellant.

Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk

Third District Court, Salt Lake County
The Honorable David B. Dee
Attorneys:

Paul Franklin Farr, Bruce L. Richards,
Mark A. Wolfert, Salt Lake City, for Respondent
Jon C. Heaton, James A. Boevers, Salt Lake City,
for Appellant

STEWART, Justice:
JoAnn Bass appeals the trial court's denial of her
motion for payment of her homestead exemption from amounts
received by plaintiff, P.I.E. Employees Federal Credit Union
(P.I.E.), from a foreclosure sale of her home. We affirm.
I.

FACTS

On October 19, 1979, while still married, Bass and
her ex-husband, Rex Paul Bass, signed a promissory note in
favor of P.I.E. which was secured by a nonpurchase money
second mortgage on their home. Subsequent to their divorce in
1980, JoAnn Bass retained possession of the mortgaged property
and continued to reside there with her two children. P.I.E.
filed a complaint February 10, 1982, to foreclose the second
mortgage because of defaults in the payments on the note.
Bass then recorded a declaration of homestead on the property
on March 29, 1982, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-4
(1987). On January 24, 1983, P.I.E. obtained a judgment, a
decree of foreclosure, and an order of sale from the district
court. The property was sold pursuant to the court's order
for an amount in excess of Bass's homestead exemption. Prior
to bringing this action and after the sale of the property,
Bass's attorney sent two letters to P.I.E's attorney demanding
payment of the homestead exemption in the amount of $11,000.
P.I.E. denied having an obligation to remit money to Bass for
her homestead exemption. The issue was submitted to the
district court. Bass's motion asserting that under Utah Code

A^e*)ds>\

Ann. § 78-23-3(2) (b) (1987), * her homestead exemption
prevailed over P.I.E.'s mortgage lien and that no security
interests, purchase money or otherwise, may be excluded from
the debtor's homestead exemption provided in Article XXII,
Section 1 of the Utah Constitution.
On appeal, Bass argues that to be constitutional
under Article XXII, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution,
§ 78-23-3(2)(b) must be limited to purchase money liens. If
the statute is so construed, then P.I.E.'s nonpurchase money
note and mortgage do not take priority over Bass's homestead
exemption, and she is entitled to receive the amount of her
homestead exemption from P.I.E.
P.I.E. asserts three alternative arguments in support
of the trial court's ruling. The first is that nothing in
Article XXII, Section 1 precludes the enforcement of voluntary
encumbrances on the homestead because that section only
exempts homestead property from "sale on execution" and a
mortgage foreclosure is not a "sale on execution," as that*
term is used in the Constitution. Second, P.I.E. asserts that
§ 78-23-3(2)(b) creates a constitutionally valid exception to
the homestead exemption for enforcement of nonpurchase money
as well as purchase money security interests in property. And
third, P.I.E. argues that if appellant is found to have a
valid homestead exemption, she has waived it by voluntarily
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-3(1) and (2) provide:
(1) A homestead consisting of property in
this state shall be exempt in an amount
not exceeding $8,000 in value for a head
of family, $2,000 in value for a spouse,
and $500 in value for each other
dependent. A homestead may be claimed in
either or both of the following:
(a) one or more parcels of real
property together with appurtenances and
improvements;
(b) a mobile home in which the
claimant resides.
(2) A homestead shall be exempt from
judicial lien and from levy, execution or
forced sale except upon the following
obligations:
(a) statutory liens for taxes and
assessments on the property;
(b) security interests in the
property and judicial liens for debts
created for the purchase price of such
property; and
(c) judicial liens obtained on debts
created by failure to provide support or
maintenance for dependent children.

No. 19766

2

signing the note and second mortgage.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION

The common law recognized no homestead exemption.
Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 218, 48 P.2d 513, 521 (1935);
Cook v. Higley, 10 Utah 228, 37 P. 336 (1894). Consequently,
homestead exemptions exist only by a legislative act. Higley,
10 Utah at 229, 37 P. at 336-37. The majority of states,
either under constitutional provisions supplemented by
statutes or solely by statutes, have some form of homestead
exemption from execution or forced sale.
The general purpose of a homestead exemption is to
protect citizens and their families from the miseries of
destitution. See, e.g., Panagopulos v. Manning, 93 Utah 198,
203, 69 P.2d 614, 617 (1937); Gammett v. Storrs, 15 Utah 336,
340, 49 P. 642, 643 (1897); Knudsen v. Hannberg, 8 Utah 203,
208, 30 P. 749, 751 (1892). Absent constitutional or
statutory restrictions, the homestead may be mortgaged and
subjected to sale through foreclosure proceedings. United
States Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Stevens, 93 Mont. 11, 17, 17 P.2d
62, 65 (1932); 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homestead § 115 (1968).
Article XXII, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution
states:
The Legislature shall provide by law,
for the selection by each head of a
family, an exemption of a homestead which
may consist of one or more parcels of
lands, together with the appurtenances and
improvements thereon of the value of at
least fifteen hundred dollars, from sale
on execution.
The first issue we consider is whether the phrase
"sale on execution," as used in Article XXII, Section 1, was
intended by the framers of the Utah Constitution to encompass
the judicial enforcement of consensual liens, such as the
nonpurchase money mortgage securing the promissory note
involved here.
A.

Framer's Intent

When interpreting constitutional language, it is
appropriate to look to extrinsic evidence of the framers 7
intent, State v. Betensen, 14 Utah 2d 121, 378 P.2d 669
(1963); Gammon v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, Inc., 12
Utah 2d 189, 190, 364 P.2d 417, 418 (1961); General Electric
Co. v. Thrifty Sales, 5 Utah 2d 326, 334, 301 P.2d 741, 746
(1956), including the record of debates during the
constitutional convention. American Fork City v. Crosgrove,
3
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701 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Utah 1985); General Electric Co., at 746;
Volker-Scowcroft Lumber Co. v. Vance, 32 Utah 74, 84, 88 P.
896, 899 (1907). Those debates indicate that the wording of
the homestead provision was given careful consideration. The
framers initially considered adopting verbatim the homestead
article from the Michigan constitution. It read:
Every homestead of not exceeding
forty acres of land, and the dwelling
house thereon, and the appurtenances to be
selected by the owner thereof, and not
included in any town plat, city or
village; or instead thereof, at the option
of the owner, any lot in any city, village
or recorded town plat, or such parts• of
lots as shall be equal thereto, and the
dwelling house thereon, and its
appurtenances, owned and occupied by any
resident of the State, not exceeding in
value fifteen hundred dollars, shall be
exempt from forced sale on execution, or
any other final process from a court, for
any debt contracted after the adoption of
this Constitution. Such exemption shall
not extend to any mortgage thereon,
lawfully obtained; but such mortgage or
other alienation of such land by the owner
thereof, if a married man, shall not be
valid without the signature of the wife to
the same.
Mich. Const, of 1850, Art. 16, § 2 (emphasis added.)
Opposition to this proposal centered on three main
issues. First, it was not as generous to large families as
the then-e*isting Utah statute which allowed the head of the
household $1,000, an additional $500 in value for his wife,
and another $250 for every minor child. Second, Utah was
considered unique in that many Utahns had small city lots with
larger noncontiguous acreage outside the city, and the
proposal did not take this into consideration. Third, the
proposal was thought to be too specific for constitutional
enactment. See 2 Proceedings and Debates of the
Constitutional Convention for the State of Utah, 1769-1771
(1898) (hereinafter 2 Proceedings) .
Several amendments to the Michigan provision were
proposed to correct the first two problems, none of which was
acceptable to the delegates. A Mr. Creer offered an entirely
new provision for consideration based on the law in Wyoming,
which read:

No. 19766

4

A homestead, as provided by law, shall be
exempt from forced sale, under any process
of law, and shall not be alienated without
the joint consent of husband and wife,
when that relation exists, but no property
shall be exempt from sale for taxes, or
for the payment of obligations contracted
for the purchase of said premises, or for
the erection of improvements thereon.
2 Proceedings, at 1772 (emphasis added). The Creer proposal
was criticized because it "contemplate[d] matters that might
properly be left to the Legislature" and was promptly rejected
by the committee. Id. at 1773-74.
The proposal eventually adopted by the Convention was
suggested by Mr. Varian and later amended at Mr. Richards'
prompting to provide a minimum $1,500 exemption. The
Varian-Richards proposal generated much discussion and was
viewed by the delegates as a vehicle to secure permanently a
minimum homestead exemption, while at the same time allowing
future legislatures flexibility to modify the exemption amount
and other details to accommodate current conditions. At the
Convention, Mr. Varian stated:
[W]hy should we undertake to fix these
matters of detail for all time, or at
least until the Constitution shall come to
be amended? [This is a question] of
public policy, depending from time to time
upon the condition of the people and the
necessities which exist. . . . That is to
say, insist that there shall be the
necessary exemptions for the protection of
poor debtors, . . . but leave that
necessity to be determined from time to
time by the Legislature, which is better
enabled to pass upon the question . . .
than this Constitutional Convention.
2 Proceedings, at 1774-75. Mr. Varian also stated in response
to delegate questions:
Now, this constitutional provision simply
guarantees that [the homestead exemption]
. . . shall never be obliterated. It must
be maintained in some form or other.
. . . The Legislature, in dealing with
this question, would regulate the whole
subject with reference to the exemption
and necessities of the case. . . . [J]ust
as sure as you undertake now to cover the
subject, you will ascertain that you have
5
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omitted something, when it is too late, or
conditions and necessities of your people
may change.
Id. at 1781-82.
There was virtually no discussion at the Convention
as to what significance, if any, should be attached to the use
of the term "sale on execution" in the final wording instead
of the "forced sale" or "forced sale on execution" terminology
used in various other proposals.
The Utah statutes, prior to and during the
constitutional convention, provided that enforcement of
certain types of liens was outside the scope of the
Article XXII, Section 1 homestead exemption. The Compiled
Laws of Utah, § 3429(11) (1888), stated in pertinent part:
No . . . property mentioned in this
section is exempt from execution issued
upon a judgment recovered for its purchase
price, or any portion thereof, or upon a
judgment of foreclosure of a mortgage or a
mechanics' or laborers7 lien thereon, or
exempt from sale for taxes.
Two comments made by Mr. Varian at the Convention
support the conclusion that the delegates viewed the existing
homestead statute as harmonious with Article XXII, Section 1
as adopted. Mr. Varian stated: "[A]s it stands now, with
this provision in the Constitution, the existing law will be
maintained until the Legislature shall modify or change it
. . . ." 2 Proceedings, at 1782. Mr. Varian also stated:
[L]et me call the attention of the
committee to the fact that we have, I
presume, what is deemed to be a good
exemption law. It has been on the statute
book for a number of years. Under this
Constitution it would be continued in
force until changed by the Legislature.
Id. at 1781.
Moreover, if the 1888 statute was in conflict with
the language of Article XXII, Section 1, the Legislature
certainly had the opportunity in 1896, the first year
following the Convention, to change the statute. However, the
Legislature retained the pertinent language of the 1888
statute. See Laws of the State of Utah, ch. LXXI § 1 (1896).
Thus, both the framers of the Constitution, and the
members of the first Legislature (many of whom were delegates
No. 19766
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to the Constitutional Convention) apparently did not intend
the "sale on execution" language of Article XXII, Section 1 to
apply to the sale of homestead property pursuant to a mortgage
foreclosure • If the framers of the Utah Constitution had
intended to exempt homesteads from all forced sales pursuant
to a foreclosure of a mortgage or other lien, they failed to
evidence that intention.
B.

Scope

However, if the framers did not intend all mortgage
foreclosures to be subject to and within the scope of the
constitutional homestead exemption, it is unclear why an
exception for all mortgages from the exemption was provided
for by statute. Apparently, the framers and the first
legislators believed either (1) that Article XXII, Section 1
allowed the Legislature to create statutory exceptions to the
homestead exemption, or (2) that the statute simply defined
what types of liens did or did not fall under the term "sale
on execution" used in Article XXII, Section 1.
This Court held in Volker-Scowcroft Lumber Co. v.
Vance, 32 Utah 74, 85, 88 P. 896, 899 (1907), that because
Article XXII, Section 1 does not itself provide for any
exceptions to "sale on execution," the Legislature is not free
to create statutory exceptions.2 The Court stated, "[I]t is
obvious that the constitutional provision exempts a homestead
from execution sale without restriction, limitation, or
exception of any kind." Volker-Scowcroft, 32 Utah at 84, 88
P. at 899. Revised Statutes of Utah, § 1156 (1898), allowed
the enforcement of mechanic's liens against homestead
property. The Court held that the enforcement of such liens
was a statutory form of execution sale and an unconstitutional
narrowing of Article XXII, Section 1. Volker-Scowcroft, 32
Utah at 81, 88 P. at 898.
However, the Court specifically distinguished the
enforcement of a purely statutory lien from the enforcement of
a consensual security interest. The Court construed
Article XXII, Section 1 not to provide any restriction on
voluntary encumbrances of the homestead and concluded that a
lien on the homestead arising from a voluntary contract
between the parties was outside the scope of the homestead
exemption—impliedly because the nature of a sale of such
mortgaged property would be a judicial sale not within the
2. Other courts have agreed that a legislature's power to
create exceptions from a constitutional exemption is limited.
In re Vonhee, 238 F. 422, 424 (W.D. Wash. 1916); Hodges v.
Cooksey, 33 Fla. 715, 733, 15 So. 549, 552 (1894); Burrows v.
Brooks, 113 Mich. 307, 310, 71 N.W. 460, 461 (1897); Tuttle v.
Strout, 7 Minn. 465, 466 (1862); Donaldson v. Voltz, 19 W. Va.
156, 159 (1881).
7
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term "sale on execution."

The Court stated:

In the absence of an express contract
creating it, the lien which a materialman
or mechanic may become entitled to depends
solely upon the statute for its existence.
. . . The decree ordering the property
sold in satisfaction of the judgment
obtained rests alone for its authority
upon the statute, and not upon any
contract made by the defendant, and hence
the order of sale is clearly an execution
sale within the meaning of the
Constitution.
Volker-Scowcroft, 32 Utah at 83-84, 88 P. at 899.
Although the Legislature has no power to restrict,
defeat, or in any way impair the homestead right given in
Article XXII, Section 1, Panagopulos v. Manning, 93 Utah at
203, 69 P.2d at 617; Utah Builders' Supply Co. v. Gardner, 86
Utah 257, 259, 42 P.2d 989, 990 (1935), the Court in
Volker-Scowcroft recognized that because Article XXII
Section I is not self-executing, the Legislature is authorized
to "provide remedies for the protection of the homestead
rights created and secured by the Constitution, and [it] may
regulate the claim of the right so that its exact limits may
be known and understood . . . ." Volker-Scowcroft, 32 Utah at
82, 88 P. at 898 (emphasis added).
Utah case law supports the proposition that the
enforcement of consensual security interests is outside the
scope of Article XXII, Section 1. In Kimball v. Salisbury, 17
Utah 381, 53 P. 1037 (1898), this Court considered the
homestead statute found in Compiled Laws of Utah, § 3429(11)
(1888) , amended by Laws of the State of Utah, ch. LXXI
(1896). Thfe Court construed the term "sale on execution" in
Article XXII, Section 1 narrowly. In discussing the purpose
for the homestead statute, and by implication Article XXII,
Section 1, the Court declared:
The object of the statute was to foster
families as factors and beneficiaries of
society, and thus promote the general
welfare, and secure their permanency, and
protect their homesteads from forced sale,
as far as could be done without injustice
to others.
Kimball, 17 Utah at 391, 53 P. at 1039 (emphasis added). See
also Folsom v. Asper, 25 Utah 299, 306, 71 P. 315, 317 (1903)
(states have right to establish homestead and other exemptions
from forced sales on execution) .
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In an apparent attempt to distinguish the
applicability of the homestead exemption as against secured
obligations, the Court stated, "Under this statute, the head
of the family • . . has his home and lands set apart for a
homestead for the benefit of himself and family, free from any
personal obligation held by any creditor . . . ." Kimball, 17
Utah at 391, 53 P. at 1039 (emphasis added).
As recently as 1978, this Court stated, relying on
Panagopulos, "The purpose of the homestead exemption of
Article XXII, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution is to protect
'the dependent and helpless' and to insure such persons
shelter and support free from fear of forced sale." Sanders
v. Cassity, 586 P.2d 423, 425 (Utah 1978) (emphasis added).
In this case, appellant argues that Peterson v.
Hornblower, 33 Cal. 266 (1867), supports the conclusion that
at the time of Utah's Constitutional Convention, a nonpurchase
money mortgage foreclosure was considered to be a "sale on
execution" subject to the reach of Article XXII, Section 1.
We do not agree that Hornblower so holds. The court in
Hornblower construed the homestead provision of the California
Constitution, which exempted property from "forced sale" in
relation to the homestead statute which exempted property from
"'forced sale on execution, or other final process.'" Id. at
276 (emphasis added). The issue was whether a nonpurchase
money second mortgage could be foreclosed against the
homestead property. The court distinguished "forced" from
"voluntary" sales, holding that if the owner of a homestead
consents (i.e., by giving a mortgage) to a sale under
execution or other legal process, it is not a forced sale.
Id. The court concluded that a foreclosure sale pursuant to a
judicial decree is not a "forced sale," but a voluntary sale,
and therefore the homestead exemption did not prohibit the
enforcement of nonpurchase money mortgages. Id. at 277. The
court did ftot specify, however, whether it considered the
mortgage foreclosure an execution sale or a sale by "other
legal process."
At least one court has concluded that Hornblower
specifically did not equate a foreclosure sale with an
execution sale. According to Nevada Nat'l Leasing Co. v.
Hereford, 144 Cal. App. 3d 622, 192 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1983),
Hornblower "held that an execution or foreclosure sale of real
property consented to by the owner was not a 'forced sale'
. • . ."
Id. at 619 (emphasis added). Although Hornblower
and most case law hold that a mortgage foreclosure is not a
forced sale, this Court on at least one occasion has reached a
different conclusion. In Local Realty Co. v. Lindquist, 96
Utah 297, 309, 85 P.2d 770, 775 (1938), the Court declared
that there are three types of forced sales that are against
the will of the debtor: (1) execution sales generally,
(2) foreclosure sales, and (3) tax sales. However, Lindquist
9
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is distinguishable from Hornblower because Lindquist did not
determine the nature of a foreclosure sale in the context of
the constitutional provision.
There has been much confusion as to the meaning and
interrelationship of the terms "execution," "execution sale,"
"sale on execution," "forced sale," "foreclosure sale," and
"judicial sale," both at common law and recently.
Historically, "judicial sales" and "execution sales" were
viewed as fairly distinct and separate concepts.3 The
difference in their nature was articulated by one commentator
in 1878:
In making ordinary execution sales, simply
by virtue of his office, the sheriff or
marshall acts as a ministerial officer of
the law—not as the organ of the court.
. . . His authority to sell rests on the
law and on the writ, and does not, as in
judicial sales, emanate from the court.
D. Rorer, A Treatise on the Law of Judicial and Execution
Sales, § 590 (2d ed 1878) (hereinafter Rorer). Discussing the
nature of judicial sales, Rorer observed, "Judicial sales
. . . occur only in proceedings wholly or partly in rem. In
this respect they are widely contradistinguished from
execution sales, at law, where the judgment is exclusively in
personam, and wherein the sale is that of the officer and not
that of the court." Id. at § 31 (footnotes omitted).4 In
discussing mortgage foreclosures, Rorer states:
Judicial sales, in proceedings partly in
rem and partly in personam, are where the
proceedings are of a mixed nature, being
directly against the property and also,
personal against the owner, as in
3. See Nat'l Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Kemp, 184 Kan. 648,
656, 339 P.2d 368, 375 (1959); First National Bank v. Barons,
109 Kan. 493, 495, 200 P. 297, 298 (1921); 50 C.J.S. Judicial
Sales § 1 (1947). One early commentator recognized that some
sales are not easily categorized. Special executions were
seen at common law as "partly partaking of the nature of an
execution at law and of an order of sale in chancery. . . .
It may be judicial and it may be ministerial, as either
feature predominates; and it may partake of the qualities of
each in some respects." D. Rorer, A Treatise on the Law of
Judicial and Execution Sales, § 592 (2d ed. 1878) .
4. A proceeding to foreclose upon a mortgage is considered an
action in rem or quasi in rem under Utah law. First Nat 7 !
Credit Corp. v. Von Hake, 511 F. Supp. 634, 639 (D. Utah
1981); Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 178, 104 P. 117,
122 (1909).
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proceedings to foreclose deeds of mortgage
by judicial sale. In such cases, there is
a proceeding in rem against the property,
and at the same time personal process
against the mortgagor to bring him as
defendant into court. . . .
Yet the sale is none the less a
judicial sale, and the sale of the court.
Id. at §§ 53-54 (footnote omitted). Rorer makes clear
view that mortgage foreclosures are judicial sales, as
sale "whenever a right or proceeding is enforced, by a
made by a judicial order or decree, under direction of
court as contradistinguished from sales on execution."
§ 29.

his
is any
sale
the
Id. at

Nevertheless, the distinctions between a "judicial
sale" and an "execution sale" are unclear, especially in a
jurisdiction like Utah which does not require judicial
confirmation of a foreclosure sale. First Nat'l Bank v.
Haymond, 89 Utah 151, 157-58, 57 P.2d 1401, 1405 (1936).
Moreover, recent Utah decisions do not seem to treat judicial
and execution sales as mutually exclusive categories.
Executions have been characterized as a form of judicial or
forced sale", Larsen v. Associates Fin. Serv. Co. Inc., 564
P.2d 1128, 1129 (Utah 1977); Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22,
29, 484 P.2d 164, 169 (1971), much like mortgage
foreclosures. Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082, 1084 (Utah
1983).
The Utah statute authorizing mortgage foreclosures
states:
There can be but one action for the
recovery of any debt or the enforcement of
any right secured solely by mortgage upon
real estate which action must be in
accordance with the provisions of the
chapter. Judgment shall be given
adjudging the amount due, . . . and the
sale of mortgaged property . . . to
satisfy said amount . . . and directing
the sheriff to proceed and sell the same
according to the provisions of law
relating to sales on execution, and a
special execution or order of sale shall
be issued for the purpose.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-37-1 (1987) . This Court has held,
however, that the reference in § 78-37-1 to provisions
relating to sale on execution does not indicate that a
foreclosure sale is the same in nature as an execution sale
11
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generally, although they are somewhat analogous. Lindquist/
96 Utah at 301, 85 P.2d at 772. The reference "has merely
procedural significance" and simply "directs that in making
the sale under foreclosure proceedings the sheriff shall
proceed in the same way as he does in making sales under
executions generally." Id.
Accordingly, we hold that a mortgage foreclosure sale
is not a "sale on execution" for purposes of Article XXII,
Section T of the Utah Constitution.
II.

STATUTORY HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION

The present statute was adopted in 1981 as part of a
comprehensive change in Utah's exemption laws.5 This change
was implemented by the passage of the Utah Exemption Act,
which was modeled after the Uniform Exemption Act. Appellant
insists that the phrase "for the purchase price of such
property" modifies both "security interests" and "judicial
liens." This construction is urged upon the Court for two
reasons. First, the statute is ambiguous and therefore should
be given a broad and liberal construction in favor of the
homestead right in order to accomplish the remedial and
beneficial purposes for which it was designed. Second, to
interpret it otherwise would be to create an exception not
provided in the Constitution.
It has always been the general policy of this and
most other courts that homestead statutes should be liberally
construed. However, this preference for liberal construction
should not be used to protect debtors from the performance of
"just obligations." Zanone v. Sprague, 16 Cal. App. 333, 337,
116 P. 989, 990 (1911). Moreover, homestead exemption
statutes "must be construed and interpreted to give effect to
the purposes and objects the framers of the Constitution and
the Legislature had in mind in the enactments." Panagopulos,
93 Utah at 204-05, 69 P.2d at 618.
The statute which preceded Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-23-3(2) (1987) unquestionably excepted all lawful
mortgages, whether for purchase money or not, from the
homestead exemption, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-3 (1953),
(repealed 1981), as has every homestead statute ever enacted
in Utah, including those in effect prior to statehood.
Accordingly, we must decide whether the Legislature intended
to effect such a radical departure from over one hundred years
of statutory precedent. We conclude it did not.
When the language of a particular provision of a
statute is ambiguous, the Court may attempt, following
principles of statutory construction, to ascertain the
5.

See footnote 1.
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intention of the Legislature; but where there is no ambiguity
the plain language of the statute must be taken as the
expression of the Legislature's intent. Miles v. Wells, 22
Utah 55, 62, 61 P. 534, 536 (1900). "The best evidence of the
true intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting the Act
is the plain language of the Act." Jensen v. Intermountain
Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984). In the
present case, a literal reading of the statute, i.e. ,
"security interests in the property and judicial liens . . . "
(emphasis-added), precludes appellant's construction without
torturing the syntax of the provision.
This conclusion is in harmony with the only other
case we have been able to find construing Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-23-3(2)(b) (1987). The court in In re Williamson, 43
Bankr. 813 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984) , held that the provision
denominated two distinct exceptions and that the phrase "for
the [sic] debts created for the purchase price of such
property" modifies only the term "judicial liens" and does not
modify the term "security interests." Id. at 829; The court
further held, "[t]he term 'security interest' as used in the
Utah statute, was meant to embrace any consensual security
interest in the property by which the owner of said property
voluntarily pledges that property as security for a debt
regardless-of the purpose of the debt." Ld. We agree. We
find no ambiguity in the statute or any indication that the
Legislature intended to alter the long-standing law of this
state. Therefore, we hold that Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-3(2) (b)
(1987) is a legislative expression that enforcement of all
consensual security interests, whether they are the result
either of purchase money or of nonpurchase money obligations,
is not within the scope of the homestead exemption as created
by Article XXII, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution.
The owner of property should not be allowed to hold
that property out as security for a debt, with the credit
received very possibly contingent on that security interest,
and then have the opportunity to cut off the security by
claiming a homestead exemption. See In re Williamson, 43
Bankr. at 829-30. The power to sell the homestead includes
the power to mortgage it. S. Thompson, A Treatise on
Homestead and Exemption Laws, § 456 (1878) . As the court in
Hornblower recognized: "Concede to the owner of the homestead
the power to give the mortgage, and the remedy for its
enforcement by foreclosure and sale necessarily follow[s]."
Hornblower, 33 Cal. at 278. Furthermore, the policy of
allowing a consensual security interest, including a
nonpurchase money mortgage, to be enforced against the
homestead makes sense in light of the history of the Utah
homestead exemption.
We hold that Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-3(2) (b) (1987) is
a constitutionally valid expression of the scope of the
13
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exemption of homestead property from "sale on execution"
created by Article XXII, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution.
Accordingly, all consensual security interests in land may be
enforced against homestead property. Because we hold that
Article XXII, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code
Ann. § 78-23-3(2)(b) do not provide a homestead exemption from
foreclosure sale, the issue of appellant's waiver of that
exemption by signing the mortgage is not reached.
Affirmed.
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